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Introduction : Approaching the Generic Conception 
  
It is now beyond doubt2 in Australia that the unjust enrichment 
of the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff can be remedied 
by restitution.3  The key to the orderly development of a 
generic conception like unjust enrichment as a rule of law is an 
understanding of the level of abstraction at which the generic 
concept operates.  'Unjust enrichment' on its own represents 
little more than a cry for justice and makes a mockery of the 
normativity of law, especially where no attempt is made to 
define the theoretical basis of the claim for justice. That is 
why jurists generating the tradition of unjust enrichment are 
quick to root the concept back to the cases. They have a 
difficult job in that many cases which fit the unjust enrichment 
                     
    
1
 B.A. (G.U.) LL.B.(Hons.) (Q.U.T.) B.C.L. (Oxon.). Lecturer 
in Law Griffith University Brisbane. The basis of this article 
originates from my year in Oxford for which I owe thanks to the 
Commonwealth Scholarship Commission, the Queensland Attorney 
General's Department and my family. 
 Professor Charles Sampford read and commented upon an 
earlier draft of this article. His assistance, for which I am 
thankful, helped to improve and strengthen the argument 
presented.   
    
2
 The acceptance of restitution as a remedial response to 
unjust enrichment is now firmly established by David Securities 
Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 66 ALJR 768 at 
777-778 which reinforces the earlier acceptance of this legal 
concept by Deane J. (with whom Mason and Wilson JJ agreed) in 
Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221. 
    
3
 'At the expense of' can mean, by subtraction from the 
plaintiff i.e. A's loss is B's gain, or, it can mean by doing 
wrong to the plaintiff i.e. restitution for wrongs. This article 
is concerned with 'at the expense of' in its subtractive sense 
or as it sometimes termed, its use in autonomous unjust 
enrichment: see Birks, P., 'The Independence of Restitutionary 
Causes of Action' (1990) 16 UQLJ 1.   
at the expense of the plaintiff formula are couched in terms 
which are confusing and at times ridiculous. 
 
Restitution is the remedial response to the unjust enrichment of 
the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff. The  
causative event is the loss to the plaintiff resulting in an 
equivalent gain4 to the defendant in the context of unjust 
circumstances.  A primary element is that the loss and/or gain 
be unjust. It is not possible to generalise as to whether the 
unjust element is plaintiff or defendant sided, but as the High 
Court has recently shown the unjust factors of vitiated intent 
and qualified intent have a definite plaintiff sided 
orientation.5  On the other hand the contentious unjust factor 
of free acceptance and the new ultra vires unjust factor could 
be said to be defendant sided. 
 
To make sense of the generic conception of unjust enrichment 
academics have constructed a framework whereby 'unjust' is given 
definition through unjust factors.6  The unjust factor is a more 
definite concept which has been given judicial approval in the 
loss/gain scenario, although more than likely not in the terms 
of unjust enrichment.  The High Court has  recently refused to 
accept unjust enrichment as 'a definitive legal principle 
according to its own terms'.7  There is no doubt that the 
                     
    
4
 The equilibrium between loss and gain represents a 
contentious issue yet to be fully resolved.  The problem arises 
out of the difficulty in quantifying the gain. In the context of 
services see: Beatson, J., The Use and Abuse of Unjust 
Enrichment, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991, Chapter 2; 
cf. Birks infra n 8 at 109 ff where the notion of subjective 
devaluation of the services is introduced.   
    
5
  David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
(1992) 66 ALJR 768 at 777-778.  The High Court took the view 
that upon the plaintiff proving vitiated intent, for example in 
the form of a transfer made pursuant to a mistake, a prima facie 
right to restitution of the defendant's gain arose, although the 
Court were quick to point out that the defendant could invoke 
defences based on the unjust consequences of having to return 
the gain. It is this combination of actions and defences that 
makes one wary of calling restitution for mistake a plaintiff 
sided affair.  The Court's use of the word 'unjust' in relation 
to the defence of change of position confuses the issue as to 
whether the defence is unjust or enrichment related.  
    
6
 It could possibly be said that this is the easy way out, 
presuming injustice by relying on the old cases.  However it may 
have been more sensible for this idea of 'unjust' to develop 
pursuant to a mature theory of (primarily corrective) justice.  
The arbitrary nature of such an approach deters many jurists 
from supporting it, but justice should be our prime concern. If 
the unjust factors approach is to be adopted it is vital that 
someone eventually measures the virtue of the unjust factors 
against a mature theory of corrective justice.   
    
7
 David Securities supra n 5 at 777.  
generic conception is open ended, but we should not be too quick 
to interpret the High Court as dismissing unjust enrichment as 
defined by the unjust factors as legal principle.  It cannot be 
doubted that the High Court has endorsed the legal principle 
that unjust enrichment as defined by unjust factors can be 
remedied by restitution.  To deny unjust enrichment in its 
definitive form the status of legal principle fragments the 
unity amongst cases allowing recovery in loss/gain situations.8 
  
  
The important point is that for unjust enrichment to have 
utility in a legal sense it must be defined by the unjust 
factors which in turn must be cogent legal concepts.   Professor 
Peter Birks has advocated the view that the taking of a 
subtractive enrichment by ultra vires demand is unjust.9  He has 
formulated the idea that ultra vires exaction is an unjust 
factor.10  Support for recovery of a payment made pursuant to an 
ultra vires demand has recently been given by the House of Lords 
in Woolwich Building Society v IRC [1992] 3 WLR 366, although 
the exact theoretical approach enunciated by Birks is not 
clearly endorsed by the Lords.   
 
The purpose of this article is to critically examine the 
introduction of this new unjust factor and its possible 
application in the context of Australian Constitutional law.  
Part I defines the unjust factor as enunciated by Birks and the 
House of Lords respectively.  Part II examines the applicability 
of such an unjust factor at a constitutional level in the 
context of decided cases.  Part III is an attempt at 
rationalising the approach the cases take towards 
unconstitutional statutes and part IV analyses the 
public/private dichotomy generated by the nature of the unjust 
factor.   
 
The article seeks to assert the thesis that ultra vires (i.e. 
acting beyond legally defined authority) without more is not 
sufficient to justify an immediate right to restitution of an 
ultra vires exaction.  In short, the article will work towards 
                     
    
8
 Much of the thinking in these introductory paragraphs is 
more ably presented by Professor Birks, see: Birks, P., An 
Introduction to the Law of Restitution, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1989, at 16 ff.;  
    
9
 Birks, P., 'Restitution from the Executive: a Tercentenary 
Footnote to the Bill of Rights' in Finn, P. Essays in 
Restitution, Sydney, Law Book Co., 1990.  
    
10
 Traditionally the recovery of an ultra vires exaction has 
been effected through the private law unjust factor of 
compulsion and in particular the sub category of duress.  
Mistake and compulsion in the form of transactional inequality 
are private law unjust factors which could possibly be invoked: 
see Burrows, A., 'Public Authorities, Ultra Vires and 
Restitution' in Burrows, A., (ed.) Essays on the Law of 
Restitution, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991 at 39; cf. 
Birks supra n 9 at 174-177. 
the thesis that ultra vires (meaning beyond legally defined 
authority) while having a role to play is not the sole criterion 
of any unjust factor. The argument that will be developed will 
be that a moral theory of authority is the touchstone of the 
unjust factor and that we should more properly term this unjust 
factor 'lack of authority'. 
  
The article deals in depth with arguments put forward by English 
judges and jurists who at this stage are constantly 
experimenting with law through the lens of unjust enrichment.  
The point to be made though is that the English developments 
will at some time in the future need to be examined in an 
Australian context by Australian judges as the current law on 
recovery of unconstitutional exactions contains some apparent 
defects of which Sir Owen Dixon made us all aware in 1959. It is 
ironical that while this article deals heavily with English 
materials the genesis of the modern approach in England comes 
from judgments of three famous common law judges (Holmes, Dixon 
and Atkin) born outside England, two in fact born in Australia.11 
  
     
Part I : Defining Ultra Vires as an Unjust Factor 
 
To understand the definition of this new unjust factor it is 
necessary to refer firstly to the incisive writings of Professor 
Peter Birks.  Birks is at the forefront of the development of 
unjust enrichment in England and is one of a number of academics 
centred mainly in Oxford and Cambridge who are keen to push the 
better understanding of unjust enrichment to the margins. 
Australian academics in their writings have been cool towards 
the wholesale adoption of Birksian rhetoric.12  There are without 
doubt major questions about many of the current approaches 
coming through the lens of unjust enrichment however there are 
areas where the analysis of legal problems in terms of unjust 
enrichment as defined by the unjust factors simply cannot be 
ignored.  As the late Samuel Stoljar pointed out in the sixties 
recovery of mistaken payments is based on the loss to the 
plaintiff and gain to the defendant.13  Ultra vires exactions by 
analogy are an appropriate topic for unjust enrichment however 
this article will closely scrutinise the existence of any 
universal injustice in ultra vires situations.  Let us return to 
Birksian rhetoric.  
 
                     
    
11
 Sir Owen Dixon was one of Australia's most respected 
judges while Lord Atkin was born in sunny Queensland (Sandgate, 
Brisbane). 
    
12
 See generally Paul Finn's Essays on Restitution supra n 9; 
Getzler, J., 'Unconscionability' (1990) 16 Monash LR 283; 
Stoljar, S., 'Unjust Sacrifice'(1987) 50 MLR 603. 
    
13
 Stoljar, S., Law of Quasi Contract, Sydney, Law Book Co., 
1964. It must be noted that Stoljar's definition of unjust is 
based on loss of "property" , a definition that the modern 
English writers reject; cf. McKendrick, E., 'Restitution, 
Misdirected Funds and Change of Position' (1992) 55 MLR 377. 
Restitution from the Executive 
 
Professor Birks' argument is that there is an (English) 
constitutional principle against executive taxation, which is 
enshrined in the Article 4 of the Bill of Rights 1689 (UK), and 
which generates the ultra vires unjust factor simply on the 
basis of want of authority to make the demand.14  The touchstone 
for the Birksian construct then is that the loss to the 
plaintiff and subsequent (equivalent) gain to the defendant is 
recoverable because the public body acted beyond their legally 
defined authority.15  Immediately on reading this theory one is 
forced to ask whether a lack of legally defined authority is 
sufficient justification for an immediate right to recovery. 
Birks takes the high ground of the Bill of Rights but that 
document says nothing about the recovery of ultra vires 
exactions, perhaps because in 1689 it was presumed that the 
legal and moral authority of the executive coincided.  In fact 
the Bill of Rights is a document which in preventing executive 
taxation has as its purpose the betterment of social cooperation 
and thus in those situations where an immediate right to 
recovery frustrates the ordered nature and well being of society 
one is drawn to the conclusion that the Bill of Rights is being 
erroneously invoked. 
 
Birks constructs his theory in eloquent style and pays respect 
to the decided cases.  He traverses the cases for and against 
the right to restitution concluding in convincing style that the 
right must be recognised. Much of the controversy caused by such 
a conclusion has been ameliorated by the decision in Woolwich 
(supra) which by majority of judges supports the Birks style 
analysis of the case law; therefore it is not the aim of this 
article to examine the case history in any great detail. 
 
Some basic points about the scope of the unjust factor need to 
be made at this stage.  Birks in constructing his unjust factor 
talks solely about an ultra vires executive or administrative 
act i.e. ultra vires as it exists in our pedagogical category of 
Administrative Law. It is important to realise that ultra vires 
in a constitutional sense is not in any mature way embodied in 
this unjust factor.16   
 
At this point of its development the unjust factor is concerned 
only with an ultra vires levying of money, and is yet to 
encompass the provision of services at the behest of a an ultra 
vires command or ultra vires commander17, or the forfeiture of 
                     
    
14
 Birks first launches this rhetoric in brilliant and 
concise fashion in his Introduction .. : see supra n 8 at 294-
299. 
    
15
 A moot point would be whether an ultra vires executive 
exaction could be recovered in Australia under the 
Administrative Decisions Judicial Review Act (1977) ss. 5 & 16; 
see Pearce v Button 65 ALR 83 at 90.  
    
16
 Cf. Birks supra n 8 at 298. 
    
17
 For example the performance of community service on crown 
goods through an ultra vires demand18. 
 
The Diceyan construct19 that Parliament is sovereign and can make 
or repeal any law it likes stands at the foundation of Birks 
theory.20  From Birks writings it is clear that a taxing statute 
of the British Parliament could never found this new unjust 
factor (other than through ultra vires in the form of 
misapplication of a valid statute) for the simple reason that it 
could never be ultra vires. The point to be made is that ultra 
vires as an unjust factor does not gain significance until we 
enter a second dimension i.e. the dimension of the executive. 
Lawyers from states where authority is defined by a written 
constitution will argue that ultra vires as an unjust factor 
must extend to the first dimension i.e. the constitutional 
dimension, if it is to have credibility.  For instance if the 
Commonwealth Government of Australia enacts a statute levying 
money (other than a tax) which is beyond its legally defined 
authority will it be possible to argue on the basis of ultra 
vires as an unjust factor that monies paid across pursuant to 
the statute are recoverable as of right?21
As the Birks theory stands it is simply incomplete and fails to 
accomplish the universality it seeks in that it ignores the 
ramifications such a theory would have for communities with 
written constitutions.  
 
 
Woolwich and the Unjust Factor  
 
The most urgent criticism of the Birks formulation is that there 
is no explanation in the theory as to why the money without more 
should be recoverable.22 The decision in Woolwich (supra) 
                                                                
land e.g. a school, pursuant to an ultra vires order.  
    
18
 For example by a custom's official. 
    
19
 Dicey, A., Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution, 8th ed. 1924, MacMillan & Co., London, at 37ff.; 
For further discussion and analysis in historical context of the 
Diceyan tradition see: Craig, P. 'Dicey: Unitary, Self 
Correcting Democracy and Public Law', (1990) 106 LQR 105.  
    
20
 Adoption of this theory in regard to the Constitutions of 
the Australian States appears in the Privy Council decision of 
McCawley v The King [1920] AC 691, subject of course to the 
limitations that double entrenchment and reconstitution can 
create. 
    
21
 Cf. Mason v New South Wales (1959) 102 CLR 108. 
    
22
 Much of the problem arises because Birks bases recovery on 
lack of legal authority, but such lack of authority does not 
really hurt the individual until the right to private property 
is infringed upon. Birks is not suggesting like Nozick that 
taxation is unjustified but he is suggesting that a right to 
private property can only be taken away through lawful means. 
The difficulty with such an approach is that if property is the 
product of social cooperation it is illogical to defeat social 
provides a more concerted effort to explain the immediate right 
to recover the payment unlawfully requested.     
The factual situation in Woolwich (supra) concerned taxation of 
the interest and dividends earned by members of English building 
societies. It had since 1894 been the tradition for English 
building societies to pay directly to the Inland Revenue 
Commissioners (IRC) the income tax due on interest earned by 
their members. In 1986 the scheme was formalised through statute 
(s. 343(1A) Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970) and 
regulations (Income Tax (Building Societies) Regulations 1986). 
 The regulations Woolwich Building Society (Woolwich) argued 
resulted in the double taxation of interest for the period of 
six months immediately preceding 6th April 1986. 
 
Woolwich sought to have the regulations declared void so far as 
they were retrospective in operation however in order to 
maintain their business reputation they decided to pay across 
the tax for the period prior to 6th April 1986.  In total 
Woolwich paid over 57 million pounds in tax for this period. 
A point to make here is that Woolwich at no time were mistaken 
as to the law, in fact they actually claimed the IRC had no 
legislative mandate.  The importance of this is that the rule 
that payments made under mistake of law are not recoverable 
could have no scope for application.23   
 
The building society were not content to stand by and watch this 
ultra vires levying of taxation and commenced proceedings to 
have the regulation declared void.  Nolan J. declared the 
regulation void and consequently the IRC repaid to Woolwich the 
sum of 57 million pounds with interest from the date of the 
order but refused to pay interest from any earlier date. 
Woolwich were not satisfied with such a result and issued a writ 
of summons claiming 7 million pounds for interest accruing on 
the 57 million pounds from the time of the original payment. To 
be successful the building society had to prove that it had a 
cause of action to recover each payment as a debt on the date 
when it was made.  Section 35A of the Supreme Court Act (UK) 
1981 empowers a court to award interest on the judgment debt 
from the date the cause of action arose. 
 
The primary submission made by Woolwich to the House of Lords   
was that a subject who makes a payment in response to an 
unlawful demand for tax acquires an immediate right to recover 
the amount so paid; and thus a power to award interest exists 
                                                                
cooperation in the name of property: see Sampford and Wood, 
infra n 68.  Birks in simply referring to lack of legal power 
ignores the real basis of his theory viz. a right to private 
property. Ultra vires on its own fails to explain why recovery 
should occur.  
 Much of the law of unjust enrichment is premised on a right 
to private property, which Birks manages to evade by talking at 
a level which presumes the right to private property to exist.  
   
    
23
 This rule has recently been discarded in Australia: see 
David Securities Pty Ltd supra n 2 at 776. 
from the time of payment.  The Woolwich approach was to put 
forward a Birks inspired argument that linked ultra vires 
administrative action with an immediate right to recovery. They 
did put forward an alternative submission based on duress, but 
this argument only finds room for application in the dissenting 
judgments of Lord Keith of Kinkel and Lord Jauncey of 
Tullichettle.24   
 
The Court of Appeal (Glidewell and Butler-Sloss L.JJ., Ralph 
Gibson L.J. dissenting) had held that Woolwich did have a right 
to recover the ultra vires exaction and allowed the claim for 
interest from the date of the payment.25  The matter came to the 
House of Lords through the appeal of the IRC against the 
judgment in favour of Woolwich. 
 
Ultra Vires as an Unjust Factor Judicially Recognised? 
 
The five Lords were split 3:2 over the desired outcome. Two of 
the Lords were not willing to accept Woolwich's primary 
submission and import ultra vires into the realm of unjust 
enrichment.26 The other three Lords were willing to embrace  the 
primary submission made by Woolwich however they did not 
unequivocally adopt ultra vires as an the unjust factor.27   
 
Lord Goff a recognised master of the principles of unjust 
enrichment provides a stimulating analysis of the issues. His 
Lordship's judgment is seminal not only in the field of unjust 
enrichment but also that of constitutional law. 
 
Lord Goff (to steal a phrase) after having laboured in the 
                     
    
24
 For an analysis of the operation of duress and 
transactional inequality in the Woolwich scenario see: Birks 
supra n 9 a 174-176. 
    
25
 [1991] 3 WLR 790. Glidewell L.J. held that the general 
right to recovery would not prevail case where the payment had 
been made to close a transaction or where the payment was made 
pursuant to an ultra vires application of a valid statute.  
Butler-Sloss L.J.  Held the right of recovery would not apply 
where the payment was made to close a transaction or pursuant to 
a mistake of law. Ralph Gibson L.J. endorsed the theory behind 
the general right to recover but held that such a change in the 
law was better introduced through the legislative arm of 
government. He suggested that the general right if approved 
could not operate with the limitations placed upon it by the 
other two judges. 
    
26
 Lords Keith and Jauncey. However it must be noted that 
their dissents were not based on a rejection of the principle 
but rather a repulsion for judicial legislation: at 381 and 410; 
although this attitude was fostered to some extent by the 
political nature of the problem: at 381 and 413-414.   
 
  
    
27
 Lords Goff, Browne-Wilkinson and Slynn.  
vineyard of unjust enrichment for so long was not about to 
relinquish a chance to further the better understanding of the 
law and harvest some of the fruits for which he has worked so 
hard. The problem presented itself in this way. The cases were 
lined up on both sides of the fence; some as Birks had 
painstakingly shown for and some against the general right of 
recovery of money paid pursuant to an ultra vires demand.  Two 
senior judges were dissenting on the ground that they did not 
wish to construct the law of today, being keen for the political 
arm of government to resolve this dilemma.  Lord Goff had before 
him an uncertain law, the separation of powers and a convincing 
academic construct waiting to be implemented, how was he to 
respond? 
 
His Lordship's judgment begins by suggesting the decision on 
appeal will be of vital importance for the development of the 
law of restitution and by acknowledging the vital importance of 
academic writings to the resolution of the issue. His Lordship 
then approaches the law resigning himself to the conclusion that 
the English law at least at Court of Appeal level required some 
form of compulsion to found recovery.  Lord Goff turning to 
obiter dicta of two great Australian born judges, Lord Atkin and 
Sir Owen Dixon, poetically suggests: 
 
... and the central question in the present case is whether 
your Lordship's House, deriving their inspiration from 
the example of those two great judges, should rekindle 
that fading flame and reformulate the law in 




Lord Goff says that in his view Sir Owen Dixon had supported a 
general right to recover in his obiter in Mason supra n 12 at 
117 and that Lord Atkin had done likewise in A-G v Wilts United 
Dairies Limited 37 TLR 884 at 887.  Dixon certainly was not 
content to simply adopt the English approach based on compulsion 
however he did not go as far as endorsing the Birks style 
construct. His concern was no doubt related to the effect the 
compulsion approach would have in legitimising unconstitutional 
Commonwealth of Australia statutes.  For Birks and Lord Goff to 
lift this Dixon rhetoric out of context is a little disquieting 
as it fails to properly analyse the nature of Dixon's fears.  
Although Lord Goff acknowledges the support of the general right 
of recovery by these two judges he fails to adequately examine 
their theoretical approaches in any detail and reverts to the 
realm of justice to explain the right.  
 
Lord Goff builds on his notion of justice concluding that: 
 
.. the revenue's position appears to me as a matter of 
common justice to be unsustainable; .... Common 
justice seems to require that tax to be repaid, unless 
special circumstances require otherwise .... the 
                     
    
28
 [1992] 3 WLR 366 at 387. 
taxpayer should be entitled to repayment as of right.29
 
'Common justice' is the principle behind the decision Lord Goff 
makes. What is this principle?  Where does it come from? Is it a 
new unjust factor? 
 
Justice as an Unjust Factor 
 
Justice is a term most jurists use with caution as its meaning 
has had technical significance since the time of Aristotle. On 
current thinking justice as a moral concept refers to either 
distributive justice30 or corrective (or commutative) justice.31  
Justice in its distributive and corrective sense is said to be a 
moral criterion for the measure of law's virtue.32  In the 
context of corrective justice it is common for judges to utilise 
the term 'justice' as if it were law; the judge saying recovery 
in this situation is just.33 There is no theoretical problem with 
judges invoking (corrective) justice as a principle of law 
however such judicial reasoning must demonstrate reliance on a 
theory of corrective justice and not just a fancy catchcry.  For 
example a principle of law could be that an immediate right to 
recover an ultra vires exactions arises where corrective justice 
requires. If such were the case then a mature theory of justice 
would be the cornerstone of the law.   
 
Lord Goff purports to adopt some vague notion of corrective 
justice not as the measure of his law's virtue but as a 
substantive part of it.  To make sense of such an action one 
needs a clearly articulated theory of corrective justice or else 
the law fails to maintain any normativity.    
 
 
Rooting Unjust to the Cases 
                     
    
29
 Ibid., at 391. 
    
30
 Distributive justice (or as Rawls terms it, social 
justice) relates to the way in which 'the major social 
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and 
determine the division of advantages from social cooperation': 
Rawls infra at 7. The most well known (but rapidly aging) 
theories of distributive justice from modern times are: Rawls, 
J. A Theory of Justice, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972; 
and Nozick, R., Anarchy State and Utopia, New York, Basic Books 
Inc., 1974.    
    
31
 Corrective/commutative justice relates to the injustice 
caused by dealings between people. For an interesting analysis 
of the this category of justice and justice in general see: 
Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1980, at 164 ff.  
    
32
 On this idea generally see : Hart, H. The Concept of Law, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961, Chapter VIII.  
    
33
 Harris, J.,  Legal Philosophies, Butterworths, London, 
1980, 261-2. 
  
When one reads Professor Birks' seminal textbook it becomes 
obvious that the modern approach to constructing the notion of 
restitution for unjust enrichment at the expense of the 
plaintiff is rooted very much in the cases.  Birks has gone to 
great lengths to explain certain causative events and remedies 
which are recognised by courts of law, in terms of unjust 
enrichment at the expense of the plaintiff.  The result is that 
Birks is able to explain in a unified way a disparate group of 
decisions.  Unjust enrichment becomes the principle which 
unifies and describes these cases. It is evident that many of 
cases fit the Birks formula, and that a better understanding of 
those cases is gained by recognising the principle of unjust 
enrichment. 
 
If unjust enrichment is to gain recognition as a fully fledged 
legal principle it must have definition. Birks original thesis 
was that unjust enrichment at the expense of the plaintiff was 
given legal definition by the unjust factors already recognised 
by the courts e.g. mistake, and failure of consideration.  When 
Birks attempted to usher in the new unjust factor of ultra vires 
he attempted to root its origins back to existing case law.  He 
was aided in his introduction of the new unjust factor by the 
recognition of ultra vires in other areas of the law.  What 
Birks has continually striven for is definition of the word 
unjust through the law as it stands. To say that the categories 
of unjust enrichment are never closed is a truism necessitated 
by the nature and function of the law, however the expansion of 
unjust enrichment must come through a reasoned and cogent 
construct (unjust factor).  
 
The Birks approach then removes any need to construct a theory 
of corrective justice as it relies simply on law it stands 
regardless of virtue. To Birks an immediate right to recovery 
exists because the law says ultra vires acts are void.  For 
Birks then the corrective justice of the situation is 
irrelevant; the law is the law and that is that.  In contrast 
Lord Goff wants his law to be based on and accord with justice 
but fails to adequately articulate a theory of justice. 
Professor Sampford in commenting upon this article has made 
clear his preference for judges being more aware of the content 
of any theory of justice they espouse. But Professor Sampford is 
equally critical of predetermined unjust factors in the name of 
justice if they do not accord with current theories of justice. 
 Unjust enrichment as evidenced by its name relates to justice 
yet Birks defines that justice in terms of predetermined legal 
categories. Such an approach is acceptable so long as the 
predetermined categories do accord with current theories of 
justice.   
 
Lord Goff fails to uphold the aims of this area of the law by 
simply referring to justice and failing to give definition to 
the generic concept.  
 
In the end it is hard not to agree with Alf Ross when he says: 
 
To invoke justice is the same thing as banging on the 
table: an emotional expression which turns one's 
demand into an absolute postulate. That is no proper 
way to mutual understanding. It is impossible to have 
a rational discussion with a man who mobilises 
'justice', because he says nothing that can be argued 
for or against. His words are persuasion, not 
argument.34
 
The words of Ross are not used in order to level emotive 
criticism at moral theories of justice but rather to highlight 
that the vague use of justice as justification in legal 
reasoning is simply not good enough.   
 
What is the Unjust Factor? 
 
This brings us back to the judgment and the question as to the 
form of the unjust factor.  The Birks theory as outlined above 
is that the payment is recoverable because it was taken pursuant 
to an ultra vires demand.  Lord Goff talks at one point of 'want 
of consideration' as the motivation for allowing recovery.35 
'Want of consideration' as used by Lord Goff (cf. Lord Browne 
Wilkinson's use) embodies the notion that as there was no 
consideration given for the payment it should be returned; 
however if this were the general rule a gift would always be 
recoverable in unjust enrichment.  This is perhaps why Lord Goff 
goes on to introduce the overriding concept of justice.  
 
No matter how hard one searches through Lord Goff's judgment 
there is nowhere to be found an unjust factor other than 
justice.36  With respect, such an unjust factor can have no role 
in the law of unjust enrichment; it is not a cogent construct. 
There is no doubt that an interpretive community would constrain 
the term in its application37  however it is a construct that 
totally defeats any respect for the development of this subject. 
 Birks idea of demand without power at least gives some concrete 
definition of the unjust factor.  Why has Lord Goff resorted to 
justice as his criterion?  The answer to this will be further 
developed in this essay and it is sufficient to say at this 
stage that he introduces justice as a flexible term which can be 
applied as seen fit by the judge to the circumstances of the 
case. What do the other Lords say? 
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 Ross, A., On Law And Justice, London, Stevens & Sons, 
1958, at 274.  
    
35
 [1992] 3 WLR 366 at 385. We are not talking here about the 
unjust factor of failure of consideration which anticipates a 
consideration in existence.   
    
36
 It may be argued that ultra vires is expressly recognised 
by Lord Goff as the unjust factor. This it is suggested is not 
correct.  Lord Goff clearly requires something beyond mere ultra 
vires. Before he will allow recovery he wants the criterion of 
justice satisfied.  This is one step beyond mere ultra vires 
rhetoric and suggests the possibility that in some cases the 
justice criterion may prevent recovery. 
    
37
 As suggested by Fish: see: Fish, S., 'Dennis Martinez and 
the Uses of Theory' (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 1773. 
 Lord Browne Wilkinson bases his decision on the cumulative 
effect of 'want of consideration', implied compulsion and 
transactional inequality.  His Lordship does though endorse the 
'want of consideration' ground and supports its separate 
application.  Lord Browne Wilkinson sees the basis of the 'want 
of consideration' unjust factor as analogous to failure of 
consideration i.e. Woolwich paid across the money because the 
public authority said the demand was lawful, the demand not 
being legal the reason for payment has failed.  Lord Browne 
Wilkinson builds his reasoning on the dicta of Lord Mansfield 
from Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp. 204 where he says: 
 
The action is .... brought upon this ground: namely, that 
the money was paid to the defendant without any 
consideration; the duty, for which, and in respect of 
which he received it, not having been imposed by 
lawful or sufficient authority to warrant the same.38
 
The difficulty with this approach is that the concept of   'want 
of consideration' only has scope for application where the 
consideration fails; for if it simply means recovery because 
there is no contractual consideration the whole law as to 
alienation of gifts is turned upside down. But has the 
consideration failed in Woolwich (supra)?  The answer must be in 
the negative as Woolwich at all times considered the demand to 
be unlawful. To suggest they paid across because they thought 
the demand was valid is to misconstrue the facts. To say that 
they paid across the money because the public body said the 
demand was valid is no help as that consideration never failed.39 
 If a total failure of consideration unjust factor were to 
operate in this type of case it would have to be in the context 
of the social coordination paid for not being supplied.  The 
point to make is that this Lord did not embrace ultra vires as 
the unjust factor.  
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 Debate rages as to the relation between the unjust factors 
of mistake and failure of consideration: Matthews, P., 'Money 
Paid Under Mistake Of Fact' [1980] NLJ 587; David Securities P/L 
supra n 2 at 778. It is conceivable that this debate has 
something to do with the approach of the Lords in this case. The 
analytical dichotomy rests on the fact that mistake operates ab 
initio and whereas failure of consideration is an unjust factor 
arising after the payment over. The two operate in different 
temporal frameworks. Birks approach to misprediction and mistake 
highlights this point: see Birks supra n 8 at 147-148 and 277-
279. 
 It is suggested that failure of consideration (a emanation 
of transfer pursuant to qualified intent) operates where 
circumstances which are capable of being fulfilled at a time 
after the enrichment fail to eventuate. Mistake (an emanation of 
transfer pursuant to vitiated intent) on the other hand operates 
where the plaintiff is mistaken as to something existing at the 
time of the enrichment.   
   
 Lord Slynn the other judge in the majority allowed the general 
right of recovery on the basis that there being a 'common 
element of pressure'40 the right could be said to built on the 
analogy with compulsion.  His Lordship found it 'unacceptable in 
principle that the common law should have no remedy for the 
taxpayer'. 41  This with respect is a poor attempt at 
rationalising the unjust factor.  His Lordship is suggesting 
that pressure combined with the perceived inadequacy of the law 
generates the unjust factor, yet gives no definite structure to 
such a concept.   
 
Lords Goff and Slynn were in agreement that the mistake of law 
rule should not be seen as limiting the general right of 
recovery.42  The place of the defence of 'voluntary close of a 
transaction' was not finally determined.43  The case is a 
tremendous example of a judiciary willing to get in to the maze 
and attempt to redirect the flow of the common law. The Lords 
will no doubt be subject to much criticism for seeking to usurp 
the function of the political arm of government.  In a matter so 
closely intertwined with politics the criticism may ring true in 
this case although one cannot help but feel that Lord Goff 
displays the dynamism a common law judge requires.  
 
Sadly though the resulting judgments are not clear enough in 
defining the basis of the ultra vires unjust factor or in 
unequivocally accepting the unjust factor. Furthermore 'justice' 
and 'lack of an adequate remedy' are simply not the stuff unjust 
factors are made of. 
 
                                                                
Part II : Ultra Vires As A Universal Unjust Factor At A         
          Constitutional Level 
 
The Woolwich (supra) decision is a long way from judicial 
recognition of ultra vires as an unjust factor. Out of a 
majority of three it is only Lord Goff that comes anywhere near 
supporting the immediate right to recovery on the basis of ultra 
vires.  Lords Browne Wilkinson and Slynn appear to rely more on 
traditional private law concepts like failure of consideration 
and compulsion respectively.  
 
The aforegoing analysis of Woolwich (supra) was directed at the 
better definition of the unjust factor as enunciated by Birks; 
it has not helped in this regard. The approaches taken by the 
three Lords representing the majority are not sustainable and 
should find little support in Australia.  That leaves us with 
the Birks construct.  
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 Ibid., at 421. 
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 Ibid., at 395-396, 421. 
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 Ibid., at 396, 421. 
The current of case and academic authority throughout countries 
with written constitutions suggests that it has never been the 
case nor will ever be the case that courts  simply declare 
unconstitutional statutes void ab initio. If this is so then the 
major premise of the Birks theory i.e. ultra vires action is 
void ab initio, is contradicted and his theory encounters 
theoretical flaws. It must be remembered that the crux of Birks 




Canada   
 
The most interesting case in this jurisdiction is that of Air 
Canada v British Columbia (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 161 where a 
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada refused to order the 
return of ultra vires (in the constitutional sense) exactions.  
The judgment of Justice La Forest in this case is seminal. 
Justice La Forest reasons that it is not unjust to retain an 
unconstitutional exaction, especially where a statute is 
unconstitutional due to a technicality.44  
 
The British Columbian statute levying a gasoline tax was 
unconstitutional and had been used to levy money through 1974-
1976. In 1976 the tax was constitutionally imposed. Justice La 
Forest held it to be beyond sense to order the refund of the 
money.  It is notable that he preferred to base his decision on 
this reasoning rather than on the effectiveness of a 
retrospective legislation levying the exaction constitutionally 
and anew.  The approach of Justice La Forest in effect gives 
life to the unconstitutional statute up to the point of curial 




The case of Murphy v Attorney General [1980] I.R. 241 provides 
an interesting insight from this country. A legislative 
enactment levying tax was struck down because it was contrary to 
a provision of the Irish Constitution protecting marriage. 
O'Higgins C.J. dissenting was of the view that an 
unconstitutional statute was only void form the date of curial 
review. He reasoned that to treat the statute void ab initio and 
give the tax back would foster anarchy and disorder.45  
The majority paid homage to the void ab initio rule but held the 
statute void only for those parties who had commenced litigation 
at the time the statute was struck down.46 This approach had been 
adopted in the European Court of Justice in Defrenne v Sabena 
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 [1980] I.R. 241 at 301-302. 
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 Ibid., at 324; cf. Griffin J. at 331. 
After early support for the void ab initio approach by Field J. 
in Norton v Shelby County (1886) 118 US 425 at 442 the American 
approach has been to treat the doctrine with caution. As Pannam 
shows in his three articles the void ab initio doctrine is not 
applied universally in the USA. Supreme Court justices have made 
it clear that the void ab initio doctrine is not universal. 
Hughes CJ in Chicot County Drainage District v Baxter State Bank 
(1940) 308 US 371 at 374 speaking for the Supreme Court said: 
 
The actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination 
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot 
be justly ignored. 
 
Justice Stone in Frost v Corporation Commission (1928) 278 US 
515 at 552 said: 
They [unconstitutional statutes] are not void for all purposes 
and as to all persons. 
 
Justice Jackson in NLRB v Rockaway News Supply Co. (1953) 345 US 
71 at 77 said: 
Even where a statute is unconstitutional and hence declared void 
from the beginning this Court has held that its existence 
before it has been so declared is not to be ignored.       
 
These judicial pronouncements make it clear that in the USA void 
ab initio is not the universal rule it purports to be, although 




In Australia the High Court has supported the void ab initio 
doctrine in the realm of torts committed pursuant to an 
unconstitutional statute.47  Section 92 has generated much of the 
litigation involving the effect of an unconstitutional statute. 
  Mason (supra) of course represents a rejection of the void ab 
initio doctrine in the context of an unconstitutional exaction. 
 This is the case where Sir Owen Dixon raised doubts about the 
prevailing approach to invalid exactions. Lord Goff and Birks 
are quick to utilise Dixon's doubts. But the truth is Sir Owen 
Dixon would have had great problems if he had of attempted to 
universally apply the void ab initio doctrine.48  For to do so 
would mean that any law unconstitutional because it was made by 
an unconstitutionally elected parliament would be void ab 
initio.  If five people in the position Phil Cleary was found to 
be in had sat in a parliament where the government which passed 
all the laws over a three year period had a majority of one then 
the void ab initio doctrine would say all those laws are 
invalid. What would happen? Could the Parliament retrospectively 
validate everything?  
 
To some extent it could however in some areas the retrospective 
legislation would not achieve much. For example to 
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 For a list of these cases see Pannam 5 MULR 125-135. 
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 Cf. Dixon, O., 'De Facto Officers' (1938) 1 Res Judicatae 
285. 
retrospectively create a criminal offence would not mean all the 
previously convicted persons could be spared a trial.  Each and 
every person convicted in the three year period would have to be 
retried to do otherwise would be to usurp the judicial power of 
the commonwealth.  In Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth (1991) 65 
ALJR 521 Justices Deane and Gaudron held that an ex post facto 
creation of a criminal offence was tantamount to the legislature 
usurping the function of the judiciary. This view which was a 
minority view does not need to be relied upon as the majority 
judgment would still mean all would have to be retried.  
 
The High Court in A-G of Australia (ex rel McKinley) v The 
Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1 gave the opinion that a House of 
Representatives elected in contravention of s. 24 Constitution  
would pass valid laws49.  Such an approach is the tantamount to 
saying that an unconstitutional enactment is not void ab initio 
in all circumstances.      
 
In summary the cases from all these four jurisdictions portray 
apprehension at unequivocally adopting the void ab initio 
approach. The cases are not very clear however on the underlying 




Dr. Cliff Pannam's three articles are the best introduction to 
this facet of constitutional law.50  One article shows how 
unconstitutional taxing statutes have been given effect in 
Australia and the USA, another how the de facto officers 
doctrine makes acts of unconstitutional office and officers 
effective and the third shows how torts committed under 
unconstitutional statutes cannot be justified under the invalid 
statute.  These incisive articles highlight the varied 
approaches to an unconstitutional statute.  His overall 
conclusion is that the dictates of justice should determine the 
effect of the statute. For example he would allow the 
unconstitutional statute partial effect in tort cases but 
disallow it effect in taxing cases. Why?  Because that is what 
justice requires. 
 
Oliver Field the author of the main USA text51 wants to keep the 
void ab initio doctrine but jettison it where justice and 
fairness require. He does not accept a universal application of 
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Katz, L., 'Ex Parte Daniell and the Operation of Inoperative 
Laws' 7 Federal LR 66 at 73.  
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 Pannam.,C., 'Unconstitutional Statutes and De Facto 
Officers' (1966-7) 2 Federal Law Review 37; Pannam, C., 'The 
Recovery of Unconstitutional Taxes' (1964) 47 Texas Law Review 
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 The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute (1935); see in 
particular at 2-9. 
the rule and the chapters of his book represent the exceptions 
to the rule. 
 
It might be argued that covering clause V operates in the 
context of unconstitutional statutes. Does it mean 
unconstitutional statutes are effective? The current of academic 
opinion in Australia is against such an approach.52  
 
 
Part III : Rationalising the Case Law 
 
From the aforegoing discussion it is clear that countries 
operating under a written federal constitution have found great 
difficulty in treating all unconstitutional statutes void from 
the start. The obvious reasons for this are: 
 
 a) if the general void ab initio rule applied, it would    
        in all liklihood eventually threaten the existence of   
        social cooperation e.g. where a legislature passed      
        hundreds of unconstitutional statutes; 
 
 b) once a statute has been used as a basis for the         
        furthering of social cooperation it is illogical to     
        deny its existence as it has existed in fact; 
 
 c) the government may have had some claim to an extra  
        legal justification for action; 
 
 d) the void ab initio doctrine could unfairly           
        disadvantage future generations, forcing them to pay    
        for the benefits supplied in the past. 
  
 e) the uncertainty and vagaries of judicial review of      
        legislative action makes it difficult to pinpoint a     
        universal time as to when the legislation is           
        invalidated from. 
 
These reasons are not meant to be exhaustive or theoretically 
mature but merely indications of the common sense of refusing to 
follow a universal rule.  
 
The Birks approach although it purports to be applicable to 
unconstitutional statutes fails to adequately analyse the case 
law. How for example does Birks analyse the situation where a 
1975 statute is declared valid by the High Court in 1980 but in 
1990 it is declared invalid by the same court?  Will Birks allow 
recovery from 1975, 1980 or 1990? 
 
The response from Lord Goff might be that the judges  
of the past have not been equipped with the proper legal tools 
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Book Co., 1979, at 1136; Thomson, J., Judicial Review in 
Australia (1988) unpublished thesis at 136-137;Quick, J, and 
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and thus have fallen into error.  This rhetoric only tackles 
part of the problem.  Judges in the past have been shy in the 
context of a written constitution to pull down from the 
beginning an unconstitutional statute because of the great 
social consequnces this could have.  Of course when we are only 
talking about unconstitutional levies it is easier to see a thin 
argument for recovery but when it is realised that 
unconstitutionality is a broad concept relating to laws in 
general, the arguments for a universal right to recovery appear 
nonsensical. 
 
The cases and academic commentators support the argument that 
unconstitutional statutes are effective to the point of curial 
review in some circumstances.  What is lacking however is a 
mature rationale for such an approach.  The remainder of this 
part shall be devoted to formulating a theory explaining the 
efficacy of unconstitutional statutes.  The theory is a 
tentative start towards the development of a mature theory which 
judges could utilise.  There is much difficulty in proposing a 
theory that one might expect the judiciary to use especially 
where that theory by the nature of the issue must involve 
assessment of political action.  Enough pessimism, the time has 
come for a concerted attempt at rationalising the case law that 
exists.  If a coherent theory can be established this defeats 
any claim by Birks for the universal application of the ultra 
vires unjust factor. 
 
The Suggested Approach in Outline 
 
In moral theory the question is often asked as to justification 
for people surrendering the exercise of judgment to someone else 
or some institution. Moral theory as enunciated by Professor 
Joseph Raz and Professor John Finnis suggests that surrender of 
judgment is morally justified in order to solve coordination 
problems. From this basic premise both philosophers build 
elaborate theories on the authority of the state and ultimately 
the authority of law. When one surrenders judgment to another 
the power holder is said to exercise authority.   
 
Leslie Green has categorised the approaches to the justification 
of the authority of States in terms of coordination, contract, 
consent and community.53  Justification for authority on the 
basis of coordination is supported by jurists such as Professors 
Raz54 and Finnis.55  The gist of the theory is that the authority 
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 Green, L., The Authority of the State Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1988, 92-94.   
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 For a stimulating critique of Razian theory of authority 
as practical reason see: Hurd, H., 'Challenging Authority' 
(1991) 100 Yale LJ 1611. 
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 Finnis supra n 31 at 231-233; Raz infra n 60 at 56; and 
Raz, J., Practical Reasons and Norms at 63 ff; Green supra n 53 
at 100 ff; Marmor, A., Interpretation and Legal Theory Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1992, at 113 ff; cf. Lukes, S. 
'Perspectives on Authority' in Pennock, J, and Chapman, J., eds. 
Authority Revisited Nomos XXIX  New York, New York University 
of the state is justified because it does a better job of 
coordinating individual action than would a bunch of 
individuals.  The social contract theory has links to writers 
like Hobbes and roots the justification for authority to the 
concept of agreement of rational people 'in order to solve 
problems of collective action associated with the production of 
beneficial public goods'.56  The consent theory of authority 
justifies authority as the product of the citizen's consent. 
Communitarian approaches see authority arising from the need for 
community for human flourishing; they start with the view that 
community is prior and necessary to the individual.57  Green 
comes down in favour of a consent based approach to justifying 
authority.58  Regardless of whatever justification for authority 
is adopted all approaches have in common a belief in the value 
of social cooperation.59   
 
The 'authority as coordination' approach is the one that shall 
be adopted through this essay primarily because it holds current 
and popular support in the eyes of many jurists. If we take the 
popular coordinative approach as the preferred explanation then 
we must determine the nature of a coordination problem. A 
coordination problem can best be described by way of example. 
Assume that 10 million Australians are desirous of having a 
system of traffic lights installed throughout Australia to 
promote road safety. A coordination problem will immediately 
arise as the 10 million individual actors will have neither the 
resources nor the power to effectively introduce the road safety 
initiative.  This is where the state and the law enter the 
picture offering a framework for the facilitation of 
coordinative action.   
 
The legal limit of the authority (coordinative powers) bestowed 
on a state is found in the constitution.60  In the Australian 
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approach in entirely different ways. 
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 Green supra n 51 at 122. 
    
57
 Green's criticism of communitarian approaches is that they 
fail to explain why authority is necessary: at 199. 
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 Green supra n 51 Chapters 6 & 7; Green's approach is a 
novel one in that the encumbrance of authority is based on 
consent, while content is seen to emanate from a communitarian 
base: at 201-219. 
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 The point to be made is that whichever theory of 
justification of authority one pursues there will always be 
scope for moral authority to exceed legally defined authority. 
For example with the contract and consent theories we must 
determine what authority is agreed to or consented to; yet there 
is the distinct possibility that the moral authority will be 
wider than the legal authority. A coordinative approach also 
presents scope for moral authority to exceed legal authority, as 
would a communitarian approach. 
    
60
 cf. Stokes, M 'Is the Constitution a Social Contract?' 
context the Commonwealth government has authority (coordinative 
power) as described by the (written) Constitution.  It is 
conceivable that the Commonwealth government could effectively 
solve many coordination problems that it is not legally entitled 
to solve. For example it could effectively solve the 
coordination problem of the incorporation of companies yet it is 
not legally allowed to do so.  Raz would limit authority to the 
situation where the state can better achieve right reason i.e. 
not just be able to coordinate but be able to further the 
reasons that should apply to the individual better than the 
individual. For example a statute creating and punishing the 
crime of murder solves the coordination problems of a reason 
that should apply to the individual viz the protection of life, 
whether the individual actually wants that or not.61  This is an 
important part of the moral theory of authority and one that 
should be given close attention. 
 
Hence it is suggested that in situations where courts give 
interim effect to unconstitutional statutes they are recognising 
this legitimate authority. They are recognising the value in 
social cooperation, however the courts fail to construct any 
universal theory as to why the attempted coordination should be 
allowed effect. 
  
The conclusion to be drawn from the cases is that a government 
can be morally justified in exercising authority yet such 
exercise of power may be unlawful.62  However if we simply 
followed the ability to coordinate criterion in the face of 
illegality then the rule of law would be rendered senseless.  
Respect for the philosophical foundations of the rule of law 
must underpin the solution. 
 
It must be remembered that moral theory will also require 
respect for the individual in the face of coordination.  Moral 
fundamental rights63 or autonomy64 will limit the exercise of the 
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 Raz, J., Morality of Freedom, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1986, at 53. Raz writes: 'the normal way to establish 
that a person has authority over another person involves showing 
that the alleged subject is likely to better comply with reasons 
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 cf. Detmold, M., The Australian Commonwealth, Sydney, Law 
Book Co., 1985, 22-26, chapters 4 and 13. A general theme 
running through Detmold's work is that the substance of 
constitutional law is not simply contained in the 128 sections 
of the Constitution. His arguments on the 'federal community', 
the legitimacy of the union (in the context of aborigines), and 
reason and the will, raise ideas that fit easily with some of 
the points made here.  
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  A rights based moral theory gives primacy to rights; in 
Professor Dworkin's terms rights are trumps.  Dworkin's primary 
right is the right to equal concern and respect, which he sees 
as generating a series of derivative rights; including the right 
coordinative power and thus 'illegal' action will not have 
wholesale legitimation.  As well the federal compact must also 
be respected in the face of claims to more able coordination. As 
the federal system is premised on the states having a role in 
government it must be presumed that coordination on state issues 
can only be carried out by state governments.  Therefore the 
suggested solution does not have operation where a state claims 
to have the right to coordinate.  It is tantamount to the 
individual saying she/he has a moral right to government by 
state government on state issues.65  
 
Distributive justice is not an issue as the question being 
raised is that of the need for social cooperation which is 
largely anterior to any question of how to distribute the 
benefits of the social cooperation.66  Corrective justice is at 
the centre of the whole issue but if it can be shown that social 
coordination is needed the claim for corrective justice is very 
much weakened.  
    
If there is moral justification for authority to be exercised in 
the name of coordination and if the community relies on such 
coordination there is much to be said for recognising the 
efficacy of such action.  The fact that the social coordination 
has been relied on by the community (including the current 
litigant) makes it unconscionable for anyone to claim it has 
been of no effect.67 It would be possible in an attenuated sense 
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 Another way to look at morality is through the medium of 
autonomy. Professor Raz while not denying a role for rights sees 
the touchstone of a morality of freedom as the liberal concept 
of autonomy: see Raz, J., Morality of Freedom, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1986, at 193 ff.; also 'Symposium: The Works 
of Joseph Raz' (1989) 62 Southern Californian LR 731-1153.  
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 It is presumed here that moral authority and legal 
authority regarding federal government coincide and are truly 
represented by the Constitution. This is perhaps a controversial 
assumption and one which severely restricts the scope of the 
approach suggested here. To suggest that the Commonwealth could 
exercise state powers and have this legitimated is in essence 
proposing a clandestine theory of constitutional amendment.  
However due to the fact that the exact boundaries of the federal 
compact depend to a large extent on prevailing political 
morality an argument for the wider effect of unconstitutional 
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exercise of power which is for all intents and purposes 
Commonwealth power as for example in the unconstitutional 
legislature cases; cf. Detmold, supra n 62 at 25-26.     
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  Green, L., The Authority of the State, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1988 at 5-6; cf. Finnis supra n 31 at 232; and 
Rawls supra n 30 at 467 ff. 
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 It is intended that the criterion of reliance is an extra 
to say the government has a claim for counter restitution; the 
unjust factor being total failure of consideration.  As well if 
the future of social cooperation is endangered by the strict 
void ab initio approach there is much to be said for adding this 
to the moral justification for authority and claiming that the 
statute should be given interim effect.  The gist of such an 
argument is that it would be hypocritical to endanger the 
individual in the name of protection of the individual.    
 
The Birks approach appears to take much inspiration from the 
Nozickian theory of distributive justice68 which single mindedly 
protects the right to private property.69 Birks does not go as 
far as Nozick but in saying that the taking of property by ultra 
vires demand requires immediate recovery he ignores any other 
claims. If the property has been taken and applied towards 
fostering social coordination then the immediate right to 
recover seems pure Nozick behind the guise of ultra vires. 
 
The point to be made is that if the community takes the benefit 
of social coordination, if a murderer or corporate delinquent is 
imprisoned, then it is ridiculous to pull down what has gone 
before in the name of private property.70
 
The Suggested Approach Developed 
 
The law must respond to these demands by establishing an 
                                                                
and not an alternative requirement. Reliance is a useless 
criterion if the exercise of power is immoral.  
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 On the right to private property in the context of 
distributive justice see: Waldron, J., The Right to Private 
Property Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988. It should be 
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specific right: at 284-287 and more in depth in Chapter 4; cf. 
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private property substantiates special rights to private 
property: at 338-342.  An excellent discussion of rights is 
found in Chapter 3. 
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property is an emanation of the law. If this is the case then 
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this: see Sampford, C., and Wood, D., ' Tax, Justice and the 
Priority of Property' in Sadurski, W.(ed.), Ethical Dimensions 
of Legal Theory , (1991) 23 Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of 
the Sciences and the Humanities 181-208. 
adequate common (constitutional) law principle.71  The principle 
must reflect the need to give efficacy to unconstitutional 
statutes where the dictates of morality justify authority and 
the argument from social cooperation is strong.  
 
The suggested approach is arrived at through the following 
reasoning. Firstly the location of moral authority allows us to 
justify a claim for giving effect to the statute. On its own 
this claim is weak. Hence the next step is to highlight the 
benefits taken by citizens on reliance of the social cooperation 
generated by the statute and the potential damage to social 
cooperation that a general void ab initio rule would engender. 
It is clear to most constitutional scholars that a strict and 
general application of the void ab initio rule would eventually 
create social disorder.72
 
If we could toss aside the morally justified actions of the 
government without defeating the purpose of social cooperation 
the solution would be simple. However the unison of the moral 
authority and the need to pay for the benefits of and continue 
some form of social cooperation demand that the common law rule 
determining the effect of unconstitutional statutes must give 
effect to some statutes. Such an argument it should be noted 
does not just rely on paying for and preserving the role of 
social cooperation but also demands the existence of justified 
authority. This is an important point because Birks has 
suggested the fiscal disruption obstacle to ultra vires as an 
unjust factor is built on false reasoning. For Birks the gist of 
recovery is the unlawful exaction and the effect this may have 
on social cooperation is ignored as the citizen is seen to have 
a right (legal or moral) to legitimate government.  But what 
Birks fails to appreciate is that a government acting unlawfully 
may still have justified authority which then turns the focus 
onto the potential damage for social cooperation. 
 
It is paradoxical that no sooner has Birks denounced the fiscal 
disruption approach than he is looking for a way to minimise the 
potential damage. The approach suggested here does the job much 
more rationally. The first inquiry is to find authority and then 
to assess the potential damage. If the first inquiry fails then 
the second should not be undertaken. This is more reasonable 
than the Birks approach which in searching for a way to minimise 
fiscal disruption does not discriminate between justified and 
unjustified government action. 
 
Introducing this morally inspired common law rule has certain 
practical difficulties.  For a start how are the judges expected 
to determine whether a moral justification exists?  The answer 
is not simple but judges under the rubric of justice having 
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being doing just that for over a hundred years. The basic 
approach must be to determine whether moral authority exists by 
firstly adopting a moral approach to authority (i.e. either 
consent, contract, communitarian or coordination). Assuming one 
were to adopt a coordinative approach the next step would be to 
determine the substance of the approach. If we took the Razian 
coordinative approach then the next step would be to assess the 
operation of the authority in better achieving right reason.  
Assuming the government performs the moral function Raz 
postulates and does not impinge autonomy, or rights, then the 
common law test for the effect of a unconstitutional statute 
must reflect the moral authority. It is important that the 
utilisation of and potential for damage to social cooperation 
must be the limiting factors. If social cooperation has not been 
fostered or used as a result of the invalid act or will in no 
way be damaged then the statute may be regarded as void ab 
initio. However even if the unconstitutional statute is given 
effect it must not be given effect beyond the point of curial 
review or a reasonable time thereafter. Such an approach must be 
taken because once the government and citizens are aware of the 
invalidity it is imperative that they legalise the new 
arrangement or forget it. The reason for this limitation is 
firstly respect for the role of legal rules in government and 
secondly the fact that damage to social cooperation can now be 
avoided.  
 
To universalise the approach it would be necessary to state the 
relevant constitutional common law principle in these terms: 
 
An unconstitutional statute is of no effect unless it can 
be proved that:  
 
a) the public authority had a morally justified claim to 
exercise authority over the people; 
 
b) people (including the plaintiff) relied on the benefits 
of social coordination fostered by the 
unconstitutional statute; 
 
c) and that damage to the future operation of social 
cooperation is inevitable if the statute is not given 
effect; 
 
whereupon the statute must be given effect to the point of 
curial review or a reasonable time thereafter.73
 
What does all this mean for Birks rhetoric?  If it is correct 
that an unconstitutional statute is not always void ab initio 
then the Birks theory fails to have universal application and is 
not the complete postulate he suggest it is.  In other words 
acting beyond legally defined power in the context of a written 
constitution does not necessarily mean that retention of an 
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ultra vires exaction is unjust.  The acting beyond power does 
not automatically equal unjust; something Birks seems to assume. 
 This is not to say that we could not use Birks approach in 
cases where moral and legal authority is missing. 
The point is that we must realise which Birks does not purport 
to do that going outside legally defined authority does not 
necessarily create a nullity and consequently an unjust factor. 
 
The Argument for Retrospective Legislation 
 
Professor Sampford suggests that the solution of the problem 
could lie in the effective use of retrospective legislation. In 
the case of unconstitutional levies it is clear that 
retrospective legislation could have some role however 
difficulties arise when one looks at unconstitutional statutes 
in general. For instance the retrospective validation of 
criminal convictions under an unconstitutional statute in light 
of restrictions on the exercise of the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth would be very difficult. Furthermore retrospective 
legislation in theory does not thwart an immediate right to 
recovery and the potential damage to social cooperation.   
 
Retrospective legislation which legitimates a prior exaction is 
no doubt based on principles similar to those advocated here 
viz. that the government when it previously acted had legitimate 
authority. Professor Sampford sees one basis of retrospective 
legislation as the principle of reliance/expectation.  That is 
the citizen should pay the exaction when levied by retrospective 
legislation because that citizen has relied on or expected the 
protection and benefits of the coordinative functions of 
government; that citizen has expected the government to build 
roads, restrain criminals or regulate companies as a protective 
measure and therefore must pay the retrospective levy. 
 
The problem is that the argument from retrospectivity only 
operates successfully if the court prevents for a reasonable 
time (in order for the government to pass the legislation) the 
right to recovery. If this is allowed then the Birks immediate 
right to recovery is thwarted albeit temporarily and possibly 
permanently. 
 
The retrospective argument is attractive to exponents of the 
rule of law yet it does have problems of compatibility with any 
alleged common law principle legitimating unconstitutional 
statutes. The argument from social cooperation is that if the 
social cooperation was justified to start with the utilisation 
of that social cooperation along with the potential damage to 
further social cooperation that recovery would impose demand 
that the money not be returned. It can be said that this is 
antithical to the rule of law however it is possible that the 
vagaries of constitutional interpretation and amendment 
especially after the societal framework has been utilised make 
it nonsensensical to invoke the rule of law. The retrospective 
approach ignores these theoretical bases and for this reason 
should be treated as an aid to resolving the problem through 
positive law but not as a theoretical solution.   
 
The aforegoing represents an attempt to rationalise the law as 
it stands. It may be decided in future decisions that the rule 
of law trumps the value of beneficial and legitimate social 
cooperation, yet until that occurs it is incumbent upon the 
judiciary to provide a current rationale for their decisions as 
the catchphrase void ab initio is neither accurate nor 
illuminating.   
 
Part IV : The Public/Private Divide 
 
The ultra vires unjust factor operates on the basis that the 
executive or (in Australia) the legislature has acted beyond the 
legally defined authority.  The unjust factor then is directly 
related to the actions of public bodies.  This applicability of 
the unjust factor raises the issue of the public/private 
debate.74
 
Birks has ushered in his new concept on a Diceyan tailwind 
saying that as Dicey prescribed the ultra vires unjust factor 
makes public authorities accountable before the private law. It 
treats the government like an individual; this is the rule of 
law. 
 
The problem is that ultra vires as an unjust factor is a public 
law concept in that it can have no operation to private 
institutions; in Birks construct it only operates at the 
executive level of government. It is misleading to say we have 
developed a private law unjust factor.  The private law 
principle of unjust enrichment then must have a public law 
counterpart.  But is this public/private divide necessary; could 
the norm not have had application equally to public and private. 
A concept like unconscionability may have done the job however 
the English jurists are keen to avoid it, because it lacks 
definition of the causative event.  
 
Ultra vires could be the principle to cover both private and 
public situations.  Why is it not possible to view the actions 
of major corporations in our society through the medium of 
authority75 and consequently the doctrine of ultra vires. If they 
exceed their legal authority76 then any gain they have subtracted 
from the plaintiff is unjust.  Ultra vires then becomes an 
unjust factor that does not divide the public and private.77  
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Conclusion : Restraining Leviathan? 
 
This article started out examining the principles of unjust 
enrichment and has ended in the midst of political theory.  
 
Returning to unjust enrichment, one can say that Birks ultra 
vires as an unjust factor construct is a very certain principle 
of course  subject though to the vagaries of the interpretive 
aspect of law.  Throughout Birks work on unjust enrichment one 
sees an intention to seek the most certain principles one can 
find. This to some extent stems from the ridiculing unjust 
enrichment has taken over its lack of definition.   
 
The view advocated in this article no doubt would be criticised 
in Birksian terms for being too discretionary.78  But the view 
here advocated need not be seen as open ended. What the judge 
must do is construct a moral theory of authority and apply it in 
the case where the legally defined authority has been 
overridden. That moral theory will no doubt be constrained in 
some of the ways Dworkin sees his theory of law being 
constrained. 
 
There will no doubt be persons feeling that the rule of law is 
betrayed by all of this. This is a worrying aspect of the theory 
however the protection of rights and/or autonomy and the 
reliance on and damage to social cooperation requirements allay 
much of this type of fear. 
 
The future of the ultra vires unjust factor hinges on its 
sensible application. Earlier in this essay it was suggested the 
unjust factor should be renamed 'lack of authority'. Such a name 
change would make it obvious that the unjust factor is not aimed 
at defeating social cooperation that exists and is legitimate.  
Whatever the unjust factor is termed the caution that is sounded 
from this inquiry is that an immediate right to recovery depends 
on a complex threshold question.  
 
The road ahead for this unjust factor is uncertain, however it 
is suggested that given a sensible interpretation the citizen 
can in appropriate circumstances restrain leviathan in private 
or public form through the law of restitution.  However it is 
only once those circumstances are fully established that the 
unjust factor becomes universal and this is what much of the 
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current thinking on the topic fails to acknowledge. In order for 
sense to be made of the unjust factor it must also be recognised 
that the right to private property is an integral part of the 
theory. If Sampford and Wood (supra) are correct the right to 
private property and ultra vires in the truest sense i.e. where 
there is no moral authority or reliance are simply different 
sides of the same coin.  
 
For Australians the correct approach to ultra vires at a 
constitutional level is foundational to our continued existence 
as a society and for this reason ultra vires as an unjust factor 
must be approached with critical thought rather than open arms. 
                                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
